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Abstract
A recent series of experiments have demonstrated that a classical fluid mechanical
system, constituted by an oil droplet bouncing on a vibrating fluid surface, can be in-
duced to display a number of behaviours previously considered to be distinctly quantum.
To explain this correspondence it has been suggested that the fluid mechanical system
provides a single-particle classical model of de Broglie’s idiosyncratic ‘double solution’
pilot wave theory of quantum mechanics. In this paper we assess the epistemic function
of the bouncing oil droplet experiments in relation to quantum mechanics. Our analysis
is framed by a two-way comparison between these experiments and recent philosophical
discussions of confirmation via analogue black hole experiments (Dardashti et al., 2015)
and explanations via toy models (Reutlinger et al., 2017). We find that the bouncing oil
droplets are best conceived as analogue representations of quantum phenomena, rather
than analogue simulations, and, furthermore, that their epistemic value should be un-
derstood in terms of how-possibly explanation, rather than confirmation. By pointing
us towards the distinction between analogue simulation and analogue representation in
current scientific practice the walker experiments evidence the wider philosophical moral
that the relations of ‘material surrogacy’ and ‘material representation’ are distinct.
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1 Introduction
In 2005, a team in Paris Diderot University led by Yves Couder and Emmanuel Fort discovered
that an oil droplet bouncing on a vibrating fluid surface can be made to ‘walk’ horizontally
across the surface. These ‘walkers’ display a kind of wave-particle duality: the bouncing droplet
is self-propelled by interacting with the surface waves it creates. A series of subsequent experi-
ments from both the team in Paris and an associated team led by John Bush at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (henceforth, the ‘walker experiments’) have since demonstrated that
this fluid mechanical system displays behaviour that is typically considered to be quantum
behaviour. This behaviour includes single and double slit diffraction and interference (Couder
and Fort, 2006)1 and quantised orbits of bound state pairs (Fort et al., 2010), as well as phe-
nomena that look analogous to quantum tunnelling (Eddi et al., 2009), Schro¨dinger evolution
of probabilities (Couder and Fort, 2012), and Zeeman splitting (Eddi et al., 2012).
A string of strongly qualified suggestions have emanated from both the Paris and MIT
teams that this fluid mechanical system provides a single-particle classical model of the pilot
wave mechanism of de Broglie’s idiosyncratic double solution pilot wave theory. For instance
(emphasis added): “Such a system is reminiscent of the early de Broglie models for quantum
systems” (Couder and Fort, 2012, p.2); “This appears very close to the hypothesis of a double
solution put forward by de Broglie” (Couder and Fort, 2012, p.6); “our system could be consid-
ered as implementing at [a] macroscopic scale the idea of a pilot wave considered by de Broglie
1Although recent experiments contest the single and double slit diffraction and interference results: at
best these phenomena are difficult to reproduce (Pucci et al., 2018), and at worst cannot be reproduced at all
(Andersen et al., 2015; Batelaan et al., 2016; Bohr et al., 2016).
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and Bohm for elementary particles at [a] quantum scale” (Fort et al., 2010, p.17520); “in spite
of the huge gap between the systems, analogies exist with some aspects of the particle-wave
behaviour at [a] quantum scale” (Eddi et al., 2011, p.459); “This hydrodynamic system bears a
remarkable similarity to an early model of quantum dynamics, the pilot wave theory of Louis
de Broglie” (Mola´cˇek and Bush, 2013, p.613); “The walker system bears a notable resemblance
to an early conception of relativistic quantum dynamics, Louis de Broglie’s double-solution
pilot-wave theory” (Bush, 2015, p.170).
The basic idea behind this suggestive correspondence is that the motion of the oil droplet
(the ‘walker’) is determined by the wave on the fluid surface in just the same way that the motion
of a particle is determined by the phase of an associated wave in de Broglie’s double solution
formulation of the pilot wave approach to quantum theory. It is interesting to ask, however,
whether and to what extent this classical fluid mechanical system can be considered a genuine
epistemic tool to probe quantum behaviour. Our analysis is framed by a two-way comparison
between these experiments and recent philosophical discussions of confirmation via analogue
black hole experiments (Dardashti et al., 2015) and explanations via toy models (Reutlinger
et al., 2017). We propose that despite a superficial similarity the epistemic function of the
walker experiments is very different to that of analogue black hole experiments. The analogue
black hole experiments, as reconstructed by Dardashti et al. (2015), exemplify the increasingly
common scientific practice of analogue simulation, where a material system is manipulated and
a formal relationship obtains between empirical terms (i.e. linguistic items that putatively
correspond to physical phenomena) in the model of the system being manipulated (the source)
and the model of the system about which we hope to learn (the target). In such circumstances it
is possible that we can gain knowledge about actual phenomenal features of the target system.
In contrast, in the case of the walker experiments, according to our rational reconstruction, the
material system is manipulated with the epistemic goal of establishing a formal relationship
between empirical terms in the source model (i.e. the model of the walker) and extra-empirical
terms in the target model (i.e. terms corresponding to non-phenomenal aspects of the ontology
of de Broglie’s double solution theory). We categorise such activities as analogue representation,
and argue that we should understand their primary epistemic function as the provision of how-
possibly explanations. In this precise sense, our account of the epistemic function of the walker
experiments has close parallels to the account of explanations via toy models provided by
Reutlinger et al. (2017).
By pointing us towards the distinction between analogue simulation and analogue repre-
sentation in current scientific practice the walker experiments evidence the wider philosophical
moral that the relations of ‘material surrogacy’ and ‘material representation’ are distinct. The
first, as illustrated by the analogue black holes example, is essentially a form of Ersatz exper-
imentation, and is used by scientists to gain knowledge of the actual phenomena in a target
system. The second, as illustrated by the walker experiments, is part of a much more general
practice of scientific representation and gains its most epistemically important function in the
context of how-possibly explanations provided by the material representation of extra-empirical
terms describing non-phenomenal features of a target system. Whilst the two may often be
performed together within one experiment, they are importantly different in both their logical
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form and inferential role. Furthermore, although relations of material surrogacy in general, and
analogue simulation in particular, can always be interpreted as simultaneously functioning as
material representations, the converse will not in general be true.
We proceed as follows. In §2 we describe in detail both de Broglie’s double solution pilot
wave theory and the walker experiments, with a view to identifying the relevant connections
between the two. In §3 we discuss the various relevant ideas that can be drawn from the philo-
sophical analysis of analogue experiments in general. First, we introduce the crucial distinction
between analogue representation and analogue simulation. Second, we consider the subtle issue
of the validation of representations and simulations, and the question of whether a single experi-
ment can combine both material representational and material surrogacy functions. Finally, we
employ these distinctions to examine the epistemic value of different forms of analogue exper-
iments with a focus on confirmation and explanation. §4 then deploys this general framework
to provide an answer to the question: What can bouncing oil droplets tell us about quan-
tum mechanics? We consider in turn the surrogacy, representational and explanatory aspects
of the experiments and offer our constructive, if rather deflationary, conclusion: we find that
the bouncing oil droplets are best conceived as analogue representations of quantum phenom-
ena, rather than analogue simulations, and that their epistemic value should be understood in
terms of how-possibly explanation, rather than confirmation. In addition we warn that, due
to the classicality of the walker experiments, their ability to be an analogue representation (let
alone simulation) of any entanglement-based quantum phenomena that involve the violation of
Bell-type inequalities is exceedingly constrained.
2 De Broglie’s pilot wave theory and the walker experiments
Pilot wave theory was first proposed by de Broglie (1924, 1927a,b) before being independently
redeveloped twenty five years later by Bohm (1952). Both formulations emphasise the existence
of an actual configuration of particles that underpins the dynamics of a quantum system, where
the actual positions and velocities of the constituent particles comprise a set of ‘hidden variables’
for the system. The claims concerning analogy emanating from the Paris and MIT teams mostly
concern specifically de Broglie’s pilot wave theory. It will prove worthwhile to briefly set out
the basic distinction between de Broglie’s original formulation of pilot wave theory and Bohm’s
subsequent formulation before we provide a more detailed account.
For de Broglie, quantum dynamics is characterised by the Schro¨dinger equation, which de-
fines a ‘pilot wave’ that governs the evolution of the configuration of the system on configuration
space, and a guiding equation, which determines the velocities of the particle trajectories pre-
scribed by the evolution of the configuration as a function of a phase defined by the pilot wave.
This velocity guiding equation is taken as the fundamental law of motion and so provides a
first-order dynamics (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009, p.29). For Bohm, quantum dynamics
is characterised as an extension of classical dynamics with the addition of a ‘quantum potential’
that is a function of the solution to the Schro¨dinger equation, and which contributes a quantum
force on the particle configuration in addition to any classical Newtonian forces. The Newtonian
relation between the quantum potential and the acceleration of the particle trajectories is taken
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as the fundamental law of motion and so provides a second-order dynamics, while de Broglie’s
guiding equation is taken in Bohm’s formulation as a dynamical constraint (Bacciagaluppi and
Valentini, 2009, p.29). Thus the basic difference between the two approaches is whether the
quantum description is fundamentally Newtonian or not; Bohm adopting the former and de
Broglie adopting the latter. This crucial difference between the two approaches thus amounts
to a difference of extra-empirical structure. It will be worthwhile for the reader to keep this
basic point of difference in mind as we dive into the detailed description that follows.
2.1 Double solution theory
Undoubtedly de Broglie’s most famous contribution to quantum theory is the extension of
Einstein’s (1905) idea of wave-particle duality from the photon to massive particles. This
idea is first articulated in de Broglie’s doctoral thesis (de Broglie, 1924) but is not the central
focus of that work. Rather, de Broglie’s aim was to propose an equivalence between Fermat’s
principle of least time for describing rays of light and Maupertuis’ principle of least action for
describing moving bodies (de Broglie, 1924, p.56). In particular, the equivalence of Maupertuis’
and Fermat’s principles suggests that the role played by the 4-momentum, pµ, in the motion
of a body corresponds to the role played by the phase differential, dφ, in the propagation of
a wave. Equating these two elements amounts essentially to a 4-vector generalisation of the
Planck-Einstein relation, E = hν, to wµ =
1
h
pµ, with wµ ∝ dφ (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini,
2009, p.42).
This generalisation amounts to new law of motion for de Broglie – an early statement of
his guiding equation – in which the momentum of a body (or particle velocity) is determined
by the phase of an associated wave.2 Significantly, such a law of motion is a departure from
Newtonian mechanics: the law of inertia no longer applies to these quantum bodies, which
would move along the rays of their associated wave, and so can deviate from a straight path
without any applied forces (for instance, in the process of diffraction). De Broglie (1924, p.80)
does presciently note, however, that one could recover the Newtonian picture by imagining a
force to be active in such a process. This is precisely the step that Bohm was later to make.
The full presentation of de Broglie’s theory – the one that we have come to know as pilot
wave theory – is given in (de Broglie, 1927a). In contrast to Schro¨dinger, de Broglie explic-
itly hypothesises that particles be understood as solutions of the wave equations of motion,
“the amplitude of which includes a peculiar singularity” (de Broglie, 1927a, p.225). Whereas
Schro¨dinger develops a perspective in which ‘particles’ are an unnecessary part of the dynamics
of the continuous phase wave Ψ (and Born goes one step further and explicitly attributes a
statistical nature to this wave), de Broglie (1927a, p.225) is motivated by the possibility of
a duality between Schro¨dinger’s continuous solutions of the wave equations and his singular
solutions representing the particles (hence his ‘double solution’ theory). He begins with the
relativistic wave mechanical equation of motion (the Klein-Gordon equation) as a description
of a particle in a constant potential, and considers solutions, u(x, t), with singular amplitude.
From this he is able to derive a partial differential equation which, in the regime in which the
2For detailed exploration of the connection between this aspect of de Broglie’s work and Schro¨dinger’s
derivation of the equation that bears his name see (Joas and Lehner, 2009).
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behaviour of the amplitude singularity obeys the classical wave equation, approximates the
relativistic equation of motion for a classical particle. Since in this classical regime the particle
velocity aligns with the phase gradient, de Broglie (1927a, p.230) assumes that it does so in the
non-classical regime also, reinforcing his strong commitment to the equivalence of the principles
of Maupertuis and Fermat (particle and wave descriptions).
De Broglie then considers a continuous solution, Ψ(x, t), to the same wave equation (which
is identical to the solutions to Schro¨dinger’s wave equation). Whereas, in modern parlance, the
u(x, t) are to be interpreted as ontic, since they represent real physical particles, the Ψ(x, t) are
interpreted as epistemic, since they are taken to represent an effective ensemble of the singular
particles. De Broglie derives a partial differential equation which, in the regime in which the
continuous amplitude, a, is harmonic, i.e., ∇2a(x) = 0, approximates the wave equation for
geometrical optics. He notes that the relativistic equation of motion for a classical particle
and the wave equation for geometrical optics are the same equation of motion (the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation) so long as the phase factors in each are identical. He then assumes that the
phase factors are identical in the general (nonclassical) case, which ensures that the singular
and continuous wave solutions are interdependent by virtue of sharing a common phase factor.
It is this assumption that de Broglie refers to as the ‘principle of the double solution’, and
this interdependence between the singular and continuous waves is the embodiment of the
wave-particle duality at the core of de Broglie’s double solution theory.
De Broglie (1927a, p.232) demonstrates that, from the identity of phase factors, one can
understand Ψ as representing an effective ensemble particle density over space, where density is
proportional to the square of the amplitude of Ψ. Moreover, de Broglie realises that interpreting
Ψ as a representation of particle density has a novel consequence: equal probability over the
initial positions of an ensemble of particles results in a set of possible particle trajectories and,
since the trajectories are determined by surfaces of equal phase, the trajectories are guided by
Ψ (de Broglie, 1927a, p.232; Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009, p.59). For this reason, Ψ is
called the guiding wave, or pilot wave, and the generalised quantum relation relating the phase
of the guiding wave to the particle velocity is known as the guiding equation.
2.2 Ontology of the double solution theory
To understand the ontology of de Broglie’s double solution theory it will prove highly instructive
to contrast his interpretation with those of Scho¨dinger and Bohm respectively.
Schro¨dinger was adamant that the continuous phase wave Ψ is not accompanied by an as-
sociated particle with a well-defined position or trajectory, rather ‘particles’ are to be identified
with the spatially distributed wave packet (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009, p.116). How-
ever, de Broglie (1927a, p.238) notes, when one considers a many-body system of N particles,
the solutions to the relevant wave equation exist in 3N -dimensional configuration space. If
this were the case, then it would be difficult to see the physical meaning of the coordinates
used to construct the abstract configuration space in the first place. Moreover, it is unclear
what physical meaning we should attach to the propagation of the continuous wave in an ab-
stract configuration space. De Broglie points out that both of these difficulties disappear if we
admit that particles always have well-defined positions and trajectories and that the physical
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picture of the system consists in N waves propagating in real 3-space rather than a single wave
propagating in 3N -dimensional configuration space.
This then is the foundation of de Broglie’s interpretation of the pilot wave. By extending his
framework for understanding u(x, t) and Ψ(x, t), and the phase identity between them, from
the single-particle case to the many-body case (where there would now be many ui(x, t)), de
Broglie is able to interpret Ψ as performing two distinct roles. Firstly, Ψ is a pilot wave: its
phase, by being identical to the phase of the singular waves, determines the particle velocities
of the system (and so the particle trajectories when the initial positions are given). Secondly,
Ψ is a probability wave: the “fictitious” wave in configuration space in the many-body case
plays the same role as the continuous wave in the single-particle case such that the square of its
amplitude determines at each point the “probability of presence” of the particle configuration
(and so the probability density of the particle trajectories when the initial positions are not
given) (de Broglie, 1927a, p.240).
What we must not lose sight of here is that, for de Broglie, the guiding equation is the
fundamental equation of motion for his new dynamics. That is, the insight at the heart of the
equivalence between the principles of Maupertuis and Fermat – that there is phase harmony
between the wave and particle aspects of the double solution to the dynamical equation – is
the key motivation for de Broglie’s pilot wave theory. So while Ψ plays the role of the pilot
wave, it can only do so as a result of this phase harmony between it and the real u-waves in
3-space. The reason it is important to mention this here relates to a possibility that de Broglie
(1927a, p.241) points out for understanding Ψ. De Broglie’s velocity law of motion is derived
by invoking his double solution principle. Recall that as a result of the principle, de Broglie
simply assumes that the phase factors in the particle and wave motions are identical in the
general, non-classical case on account of establishing that the particle velocity aligns with the
phase gradient in the classical case. But one could just as easily assume the velocity law to
hold as a postulate of the theory, rather than derive it from some underlying foundation. As
a consequence, one could consider the pilot wave Ψ as physically real, and distinct from the
reality of the material point, such that the motion of the material point is determined as a
function of the phase of the pilot wave by the velocity law (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009,
p.64), just as Bohm later suggested.
De Broglie does not advocate this position as the appropriate way to understand his theory.
Indeed, de Broglie (1927a, p.241) is explicit about considering this understanding of Ψ as a
real pilot wave in this sense with a “provisional attitude”, preferring the above account of his
double solution theory – and believing that the provisional account would ultimately lead one
towards something analogous to the double solution theory. However, de Broglie (1927b) went
on to present precisely this provisional theory at the fifth Solvay conference in 1927, with no
use made of the principle of the double solution (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009, p.67–69).
It was this provisional theory that became known as de Broglie’s pilot wave theory, and it was
this theory that Bohm rediscovered 25 years later, rectifying some of the outstanding problems
identified with de Broglie’s presentation of the theory at the fifth Solvay conference. Thus, in
so far as Bohm’s pilot wave theory is operationally equivalent to quantum mechanics (Bohm,
1952, p.166), so too is de Broglie’s truncated ‘provisional’ theory operationally equivalent to
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quantum mechanics. But this equivalence belies the significant foundational differences between
de Broglie’s original double solution formulation and Bohm’s later formulation.
The major divergence is that de Broglie takes his guiding equation to be a novel, non-
Newtonian, fundamental law of motion. De Broglie is well aware of the possibility that the
addition of a Newtonian force, underpinned by a new quantum potential, could plausibly ac-
count for the noninertial motion that results from this law, and he explicitly derives this classical
formulation of the particle dynamics and, in the nonrelativistic limit, the additional potential
energy term is precisely Bohm’s ‘quantum potential’ (de Broglie, 1927a, p.237; Bacciagaluppi
and Valentini, 2009, p.61). However, for de Broglie this is merely a demonstration of the rela-
tion between his new mechanics and classical mechanics. In contrast, the Newtonian relation
between the quantum potential and the acceleration of the particle trajectories is taken by
Bohm to be the fundamental law of motion, and this provides a second-order dynamics (while
de Broglie’s guiding equation is taken in Bohm’s formulation as a dynamical constraint).
The divergence between de Broglie and Bohm is thus manifest at the ontological level.
Whereas for Bohm (1952, p.170) the pilot wave Ψ is “a mathematical representation of an
objectively real field”, for de Broglie Ψ is a ‘fictitious’ probability wave and it is the ui that
are real waves in 3-space. Despite the fact that de Broglie never completed his double solution
theory – notwithstanding later attempts (de Broglie, 1959, 1971)) – de Broglie had a clear idea
of the ontology of his theory: an N -body system consists of N singular u-waves propagating in
real 3-space, each defining particle motion according to the velocity equation, and whose phase
is interrelated with the phase of the probability wave Ψ that guides and constrains system
behaviour. Understanding the walker experiments as a concrete representation of this ontology
will prove crucial to our analysis of the epistemic function of the experiments in the remainder
of the paper.
2.3 The walker experiments
Consider a small, shallow rectangular bath oriented horizontally, filled with a layer of silicon
oil, and parametrically driven by a low frequency generator to vibrate vertically. By piercing
the fluid surface with a pin and then withdrawing quickly, a small oil droplet can be created
which, due to the forced vibrations, bounces upon the fluid surface. There are two key features
of the walker experiments. Strictly below the Faraday instability threshold,3 beyond which
forced standing waves appear on the surface of the fluid, the fluid surface is stable. When the
bouncing droplet comes into contact with the surface it emits a travelling capillary wave (like a
pebble dropped into a still pond) radially damped by the viscosity of the fluid. Thus, the first
key feature is that each droplet is a local source of a standing Faraday wave that is sustained
by the externally driven, vertically vibrating fluid (Protie`re et al., 2005). During the time that
the droplet is in flight above the fluid, this capillary wave evolves freely across the surface.
When the droplet next bounces on the surface, small deviations in the flight of the droplet can
cause the impact to occur to one side of the central crest of the capillary wave, and thus on
an inclined surface. This deviation imparts a horizontal impetus on the droplet such that the
3The phenomenon of Faraday instability is closely related to the more familiar phenomenon of grains of
sand on the surface of a beaten drum forming geometrical patterns (Faraday, 1831).
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next surface impact again occurs on an inclined surface. As Protie`re et al. (2006, p. 92) put it:
Each time the drop hits the surface a new dip forms, shifted from the trough that would have
been formed by the evolution of the previous wave-packet. The resulting wave is thus the
superposition of waves generated by a source that is slightly displaced at each jump.
Within the appropriate parameter regime, the Faraday wave spontaneously propels the droplet
to ‘walk’ horizontally across the surface, coupling the motion of the droplet to the vertical
displacement of the fluid surface (Protie`re et al., 2006).
Significantly, the damping of the capillary waves that a droplet emits is inversely propor-
tional to the distance to the Faraday instability threshold: the closer the driving frequency gets
to the threshold, the longer the damping length becomes. This is then the second key feature of
the walker experiments: due to the external impetus applied to vibrate the fluid, the standing
Faraday waves created from each bounce of the droplet are sustained (again, in the appropriate
parameter regime) for very many bounces of the droplet. The vertical displacement of the fluid
surface at any point is thus the linear combination of very many distinct Faraday waves, and
this provides the surface wave with a path memory of where the droplet has recently been (Eddi
et al., 2011). In other words, the increase in damping length gained by driving the vibration
closer to the Faraday instability threshold enables a greater radius of interaction between the
droplet and its environment.
The combination of the two key features of the walker experiments – that each droplet is
a local source of a standing Faraday wave, and that the standing Faraday waves from each
bounce of the droplet are sustained for very many bounces – yields a surface wave that is a
superposition of many standing waves, each encoding information about the previous movement
of the droplet. The subsequent motion of the droplet, bouncing off the fluid surface, is then a
function of the information encoded in the surface wave:
Here, each bounce of the droplet, by disturbing the interface, records information about the
spatio-temporal localization of the collision. This information is stored because each bounce
generates a sustained localized state of Faraday waves. The information being stored in waves,
the data about the trajectory are cumulated in an interference pattern due to the waves’ linear
superposition. Later, as the drop collides again with the interface, it ‘reads’ this cumulated
information and the local slope of the distorted surface determines the direction and amplitude
of the next jump. The dual nature of the walker is contained in the path memory dynamics:
the wave nature lies in the coding while the particle nature lies in the reading. Eddi et al.
(2011, p.461)
This is how the oil droplet comes to be coupled to the surface wave, and so provide what we
might call pilot wave dynamics: the “interplay between the droplet motion and its associated
wave field makes it a macroscopic implementation of a pilot wave dynamics” (Couder and Fort,
2012, p.2).
Another feature of the walker experiments, related to path memory, has received far less
attention (although Vervoort (2016) gestures towards it). Each time the droplet bounces on the
fluid surface a distinct damped travelling capillary wave is emitted4 that travels at a velocity
4“These waves are. . . the travelling equivalent of the standing Faraday waves usually observed” (Protie`re
et al., 2006, p. 91).
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typically about 10 times the walking velocity of the particle (Protie`re et al., 2006, p. 95).
Given a boundary – such as a wall, a slit, a submerged barrier or a new particle with its own
associated wave – within the damping length of the capillary wave, the surface wave that results
from the superposition of successive capillary waves will contain a reflected component encoding
information about this boundary. Since the particle is coupled to this wave, the motion of the
particle is in part influenced by spatially remote boundaries (so long as they are within the
damping length), producing what we might call ‘nonlocal’ effects. Significantly, some of these
nonlocal boundaries lie in the ‘future’ path of the walking particle and it is this “echo-location”
feature that explains, for instance, the diffraction of a particle walking through a single slit
(Couder and Fort, 2012, p.2).
A combination of the path memory and these ‘nonlocal’ effects provides for some interesting
properties of the droplet motion, the most significant being chaotic motion in the presence of
obstacles. As Eddi et al. (2011, p.461) state:
Other dramatic effects of the memory are observed whenever boundaries generate any kind of
confinement of the walker. In these situations, the waves emitted in the past and reflected by
the boundaries lead to a complex structure of the interference field and correspondingly to a
disorder in the droplet motion.
In a more recent set of experiments performed by the team at MIT, in collaboration with the
Paris team, a further significant phenomenon has been detected (Harris et al., 2013). Given
a defined bath geometry, a droplet will move chaotically under the guidance of the surface
wave. After enough time, taking a record of the droplet’s total path yields a location density
map representing the statistical behaviour of the droplet. This map can be interpreted as the
probability distribution for the droplet’s location at some time. It turns out that this probability
distribution is related to the Faraday modes of the bath geometry. There are then two wavelike
modes of description for the droplet’s behaviour: a surface wave (that is a superposition of
capillary waves) guides (chaotically) the motion of the droplet, and a probability wave (that is
a function of the geometry of the fluid boundary) constrains the distribution of the locations
at which the droplet might be found at any time. Here is Harris et al. (2013, p.011001-4) on
this point:
We can thus understand the probability distribution as being a manifestation of the character-
istics of the underlying trajectories. In the confined circular geometry, the pilot wave dynamics
tends to drive the walker along circular orbits with radii corresponding to maxima of the cavity
mode amplitude. Instead of being trapped on these orbits as in the low-path-memory limit,
the walker wobbles around them and drifts between them; nevertheless, these unstable orbits
leave their mark on the probability distribution.
This then completes the collection of phenomena that are the significant features of the
walker experiments which suggest an analogy with de Broglie’s double solution theory. Echoing
our sentiment at the end of §2.2 above, Harris et al. (2013, p.011001-4) summarise nicely:
Our study indicates that this hydrodynamic system is closely related to the physical picture
of quantum dynamics envisaged by de Broglie, in which rapid oscillations originating in the
particle give rise to a guiding wave field. The pilot wave theories of de Broglie and Bohm
are often conflated; however, it is valuable to distinguish between them here for the sake of
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comparison with our system. According to Bohm, the particle is guided by its statistical wave,
its velocity being equivalent to the quantum velocity of probability. According to de Broglie’s
double-wave solution, the particle is guided by a real wave (of unspecified origins) in such a
way as to execute a dynamics whose statistics is described by standard quantum theory.
It should be clear that there are some striking analogies between the mechanism of the
walker experiments and the ontology of de Broglie’s double solution theory.5 At the heart
of these analogies is wave-particle duality. First and foremost, the interrelation between the
surface wave of the fluid and the motion of the oil droplet appears analogous to the interrelation
between each u-wave in 3-space and its associated singular amplitude. Through de Broglie’s
guiding equation, the particle-like behaviour of these singularities is closely aligned with the
wave-like behaviour of their associated u-wave. Likewise, the particle-like behaviour of the
walker is closely aligned with the wave-like behaviour of the surface wave.
Furthermore, the differentiation between the real ui in 3-space determining the behaviour of
quanta via the guiding equation and the pilot wave Ψ in configuration space that guides system
behaviour through constraining probability current density (the two interrelated by the double
solution principle) is analogous to the differentiation between the surface wave guiding the
imminent trajectory of the oil droplet and the probability wave (related to the Faraday modes)
that constrains the location density map representing the long-run statistical behaviour of the
droplet. It is primarily for this reason that the fluid mechanical system more closely resembles
the ontology of de Broglie’s double solution theory than that of Bohm’s pilot wave theory.
Finally, we should not forget the lengthy list of typically quantum phenomena displayed by the
fluid mechanical system: (possibly) single and double slit diffraction and interference, quantised
orbits of bound state pairs, phenomena that look like quantum tunnelling, Schro¨dinger evolution
of probabilities, and Zeeman splitting (but with the conspicuous absence of any entanglement-
based quantum phenomena that involve the violation of Bell-type inequalities).
It remains to be seen whether this analogy implies that these experiments can tell us some-
thing about quantum mechanics. What value do these experiments have as epistemic tools
to probe quantum theory? In order to answer this question, it will be helpful to consider
a selection of issues relating to the philosophical analysis of analogue experiments in general
terms.
3 Analogue experiments
3.1 Representation and simulation
Before we start our discussion it will be instructive to introduce some terminology relating
to different parts of scientific theories and models and their putative correlates in the world.
We will use the word term to denote any linguistic items within a theory or model. This
includes terms in the logical sense, statements, equations, diagrams, or structures. Such ‘terms’
putatively stand in a relation of representation to elements of reality within the world. The
precise nature of this representation relation is something regarding which we will endeavour to
stay as neutral as possible – we take what we say below to be compatible with any of the various
5This point is also made by Bush (2015).
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accounts in the contemporary literature.6 We can distinguish three different classes of terms
on the basis of the three different classes of elements of reality to which they can putatively
correspond. First, we have observable terms that correspond to observable phenomena. In
the context of physical science such observable phenomena will typically be physical quantities
whose value can be directly measured or observed. For example, the angle between the angular
diameter of the Moon seen from the Earth. It is important to distinguish between these terms
and empirical terms that correspond to both observable and unobservable phenomena. That
is, a larger set of elements of reality that (in the context of physical science) also typically
includes physical quantities the value of which cannot be directly measured or observed, but
rather only indirectly measured or inferred. The most vivid example of such a term is probably
the mass of the Higgs boson, but various other examples can be found in both historical and
contemporary physics.
As powerfully argued by Massimi (2007), building on the earlier ideas of Bogen and Wood-
ward (1988), such unobservable phenomena are what is typically ‘saved’ by scientists in experi-
mental particle physics, and should thus be taken as part of any adequate empiricist philosophy
of science, pace Van Fraassen (1980). Further discussion of the observable versus unobservable
phenomena distinction is found in Evans and The´bault (2019). For the purpose of the current
paper, the more important distinction is between empirical terms and what we will call extra-
empirical terms. These are linguistic items within a theory or model that putatively stand in
a relation of representation to elements of reality within the world that are non-phenomenal.
That is, elements of reality that are not physical quantities. The most powerful examples of
such non-phenomenal elements of reality, to which we will refer back later, are absolute space
in Newtonian mechanics and the wavefunction in quantum mechanics.
With our terminology in place, we can now introduce a distinction between two types of
practice in contemporary physical science, both of which might be referred to as ‘analogue
experiments’.7 The first, following the rational reconstruction of Dardashti et al. (2015), we
call analogue simulation. This is when an experiment is conducted on a source system of
one type of material constitution in order to learn about a target system, of another type of
material constitution, on the basis of an isomorphism between terms in the respective modelling
frameworks that provide adequate descriptions of the source and target in the relevant domain.
A necessary feature of this notion of analogue simulation is that the isomorphism must connect
at least some empirical terms defined in the two modelling frameworks. In fact, it is in virtue
of the connection between such terms that the epistemic function of an analogue simulation
can be fulfilled. Analogue simulations are designed for learning about empirical features of the
6An excellent recent discussion specifically relating to representation via material models is (Frigg and
Nguyen, 2018). Further accounts, all of which we take to be compatible with our use of ‘representation’ below,
are (Hughes, 1997; Giere, 1999; Sua´rez, 2004; Contessa, 2007; Bailer-Jones, 2009; Weisberg, 2012). A good
overview of various connected issues is provided in (Gelfert, 2016, §2).
7We will not here consider the connection to the wide range of types of ‘analogue experiments’ found in the
context of the life sciences. Whilst there are, for example, broad conceptual connections between our analysis
below and the analysis of ‘surrogate models’ and ‘model organisms’, the differing degree of formalisation of the
two sciences render the details of physical and biological analogue experiments importantly different. See, for
example, (Bolker, 2009; Levy and Currie, 2014; Baetu, 2015). In interests of space, we will also neglect the
subtle connection between analogue experiments and arguments by analogy. See (Bartha, 2019) for further
discussion.
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Figure 1: The structure of analogue simulation. A syntactic isomorphism between MS and
MT is exploited to infer (inference in orange) from a phenomenon PS of S the existence of an
inaccessible phenomenon PT of T .
target system via the manipulation of the source system. Dardashti et al. (2015, p.67) claim,
then, that a system S provides an analogue simulation of a system T when: MS is an adequate
modelling framework for S within some domain of conditions DS; MT is an adequate modelling
framework for T within some domain of conditions DT ; a syntactic isomorphism can be defined
between MS and MT ; under DT , some property of T is observationally inaccessible; under DS,
S exhibits phenomenon PS; thus, one can infer that under DT , T will exhibit phenomenon PT
(Fig.1).
As indicated by the name, analogue simulation has a lot in common with the use of com-
puter simulation since it involves ‘programming’ a physical source system such that there is a
quantitative correspondence between terms in the mathematical model that describes the source
system and the counterpart terms in the model that describes the target system.8 Such activity
has seen a growing number of applications in research in the contemporary context of quantum
simulation (Cirac and Zoller, 2012; Georgescu et al., 2014) and analogue gravity (Barcelo´ et al.,
2011; Faccio et al., 2013).
The most vivid modern example of an analogue simulation, and the inspiration for the
analysis of Dardashti et al. (2015), is that of an analogue black hole or ‘dumb hole’. Here
the isomorphism is between the equations describing a black hole event horizon and those
describing a sonic horizon in fluids, and the crucial empirical terms are those describing a
thermalised photonic flux, Hawking radiation, and its thermal phononic counterpart (Unruh,
1981). The crucial characteristic of an analogue simulation is for our purposes that: i) the
source-target isomorphism relation is a mathematical one at the level of models; and ii) the
isomorphism is principally established in order to exploit structural similarities that relate to
empirical terms in the respective models.
8This is unsurprising since core aspects of the Dardashti et al. (2015) conception of analogue simulation are
drawn from earlier comparison of such practice with computer simulations due to Winsberg (2010, 2019).
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The second type of experimental scientific practice, which can also be placed under the
heading of analogue experimentation, we call analogue representation. This is a much broader
category since it involves exploiting analogical relationships between source and target systems
for essentially any scientific purpose. Most vividly, the use of plastic models of molecules
by chemists is an example of analogue representation. In this case, the important relation
is clearly not necessarily a formal relationship between mathematical models. Rather, the
analogue representation gains its scientific value from the extent to which the source system
itself (for instance, the plastic molecule) is appropriately representative of the abstract model
of the target system (for instance, the theoretical model of the molecule).
Crucially here the relevant notion of representative correspondence need not be a precise
mathematical one, and moreover need not be restricted to empirical terms within the abstract
model of the target system. In fact, arguably one of the key virtues of analogue representations is
that they allow us to produce concrete representations of extra-empirical terms. A particularly
interesting form of analogue representation, which we will find to be of particular relevance to
our case study, is when such representations are formalised via a syntactic isomorphism between
modelling frameworks describing the source and target. In this context, analogue representation
takes a structurally very similar form to analogue simulation, only with the isomorphism holding
between empirical terms in the source model and extra-empirical terms in the target model.
Just as analogue simulation via an experimental system is very similar in structural form to
simulation via a computer, this kind of analogue representation via an experimental system
has a natural correspondence to representations via a computer. Consider, for example, the
representation of Newtonian space given by a 3D computer depiction of Euclidean geometry via
a grid on a screen. This is a representation of a theoretical term within a modelling framework
in virtue of an isometric mapping between the extra-empirical term E3 in the Newtonian model
(‘the target’) and the grid lines on the screen (‘the source’).
These consideration point us towards a very general moral regarding the difference between
two relations that might be called ‘material surrogacy’ and ‘material representation’. The first
is essentially a form of Ersatz experimentation, and is used by scientists to gain knowledge of
the actual phenomena in a target system. The second is part of a much more general practice
of scientific representation and relates to the representation via the source system of extra-
empirical terms describing non-phenomenal features of a target system. Whilst the two may
often be performed together within one experiment, they are importantly different in both their
logical form and, as we shall see below, their inferential role. Furthermore, although relations of
material surrogacy in general, and analogue simulation in particular, can always be interpreted
as simultaneously functioning as material representations, the converse will not in general be
true.
3.2 Validation
Conventional experiments only gain their value as epistemic tools via a process of validation
(Franklin and Perovic, 2016). In conventional experiments in order to make inferences about
a target system based on an experiment on a source a scientist requires arguments that they
genuinely did learn about, first, the source system (the experiment is internally valid) and,
14
second, that this knowledge is genuinely relevant to the features of a system or class of systems
which they did not manipulate (the experiment is externally valid). In a conventional experi-
ment, the experimenters will usually leverage the uniformity of particular material kinds as at
least part of their justificatory story regarding why the source can stand in for the target in the
appropriate sense.9 Analogue simulations can be understood as subject to a structurally similar
validation process. That is, their epistemic function requires that they must be supplemented
with further arguments for internal and external validity. However, so far as external validation
goes, such arguments are going to be of a very different form to those found in conventional ex-
periment since the source and target are different kinds of material by construction. If analogue
simulations are genuinely probative of empirical features of the target system it will typically
only be due to these features being suitably independent of the material constitution. Building
upon the work of Dardashti et al. (2015), The`bault (2019) has argued that we can think of
universality arguments as playing the role of external validation in the case of the analogue
black hole example of analogue simulation. Hangleiter et al. (2017) give a parallel analysis for
the case of analogue quantum ‘emulations’, and consider possible means of validation for an
analogue experiment wherein a photonic source system is manipulated with the goal of learn-
ing about the phenomena of environment-assisted quantum transport in certain photosynthetic
complexes.
This is where the case of analogue experiments understood as analogue representations
looks remarkably different. When the source-target relation is between extra-empirical and
empirical terms, considerations of material similarity are not of great relevance. Consider a
plastic model of a plastic molecule, where the material of the plastic model is the same as
the molecule which it represents. The analogue representation need not be established as a
good representation of the extra-empirical terms that describe the molecule in virtue of the
material similarity. Rather, it is a good representation in so far as it is a useful depiction
of the theoretical model of the molecule for pedagogical purposes. How we should evaluate
the success or failure of representation relationships is subtle and controversial.10 It suffices
for our purposes to note that given any of the various accounts of representation, the style
of argument by which representation relations between source and target are justified is much
broader and more flexible then the external validation arguments required in either conventional
experiments or analogue simulations. In particular, neither material similarity nor material
independence are necessary parts of such arguments. In the cases which are of interest to us,
what is important is the isomorphism between extra-empirical terms in the target model that
are difficult to conceptualise (say, the interrelation between the particle and pilot wave in the
double solution ontology) and empirical terms in the source model that are visually identifiable
(say, the interrelation between the walker and the surface wave). So long as that correspondence
holds, the analogue experiment is usefully performing its representational function.
Just as the boundary between analogue representation and conventional experiment is not
a strict one (consider analogue representations of bridges interacting with water or aeroplane
wings in air tunnels), the boundary between analogue simulation and analogue representation
9The form of such inferences is explored in more detail in Evans and The´bault (2019).
10See the literature on representation in science to which we refer in fn.6.
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is also fairly ambiguous. This point is made particularly clear by the observation that some
analogue experiments function as a combination of both an analogue simulation (since there is
an isomorphism between empirical terms in the source and target models) and as analogue rep-
resentation (since the source system can also be considered a representation of extra-empirical
terms in the target model). The similarity to computer simulation is again instructive. Con-
sider a simulation of three particles moving according to the laws of Newtonian gravitation
that is represented on a computer screen via three dots moving in the Euclidean grid lines
described above. Clearly this is performing both surrogacy and representational functions.
There is an isomorphism between the empirical terms (i.e. the relative positions and velocities
of the particles) in the Newtonian model and the relative positions of the dots, and between
an extra-empirical term (Euclidean space) and the grid lines. Similarly it is very plausible
to think that an analogue experiment can perform both the surrogacy and representational
function simultaneously.
Consider again then the case of an analogue black hole. In this case, as well as there being
an isomorphism between observables in the fluid and black hole model (e.g. Hawking radia-
tion) we can also think of the flow of the fluid as a representation of spacetime. Crucially,
the question of whether the source system adequately plays the first, material surrogacy role is
independent from the question of whether it plays the second, representational role.11 Whilst a
single analogue experiment may well be simultaneously interpretable as either an analogue sim-
ulation or analogue representation, for justificatory purposes we must be sensitive to important
differences between these two functions.
3.3 Confirmation and explanation
With these distinctions and definitions in hand we can finally consider the question of what
we can actually learn via analogue experiments. Again, it is worth making reference to the
arguments of Dardashti et al. (2015) who claim that there can be ‘confirmation via analogue
simulation’ in circumstances where the analogue experiment is externally validated by reference
to universality arguments that show that the empirical phenomena being simulated are suitably
independent of the differences in material constitution between source and target system. The
idea is that the universality arguments provide a common empirically grounded reason for
believing in the empirical validity of both the source and target modelling frameworks within
their domain of application. In virtue of that connection, inductive support for the one is
then taken to be also inductive support for the other. The claims of Dardashti et al. (2015)
have drawn contrasting reactions. Subsequent analysis has included extensions in terms of
formal frameworks for confirmation theory (Dardashti et al., 2019; Feldbacher-Escamilla and
Gebharter, forthcoming), further exploration of the connection to conventional experiments
and computer simulations (Boge, 2018) and a (contentious) discussion of ‘circularity’ inherent
in such patterns of inference (Crowther et al., 2019; Bartha, 2019; Evans and The´bault, 2019).
11It is worth noting that, in this case, the experimenters are not, as it happens, particularly interested in
the second function of their experiment since their main focus is on simulating empirical phenomena, and in
justifying their inferences based upon universality arguments. Most likely this is because the mathematical
models of a black hole in terms of Schwarzschild geometry already has a variety of simple visual representations
(e.g. topographic diagram or Penrose diagram).
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The last of these discussions is worth briefly summarising. Crowther et al. (2019) claim
that confirmation via analogue simulation can only be given a non-circular justification in
the case of accessible target systems. In response, Evans and The´bault (2019) first point out
that, as an inductive form of inference, analogue simulation cannot be consistently classed
as premise circular since, as ampliative inferences, inductive arguments cannot by definition
be premise-circular. Then, a charitable reconstruction of the reasoning implicit behind the
argument of Crowther et al. in terms of a problem of rule-circularity is shown also to fail, unless
Crowther et al. are adopting the unreasonable (in this context) position of inductive sceptics.
Finally, Evans and The´bault interpret Crowther et al. to be offering two reasonable grounds for
worry based upon an appeal to inter-type uniformity or the confirmation of theories regarding
inaccessible target systems. Evans and The´bault argue that to rule out gaining knowledge
regarding astrophysical Hawking radiation based upon analogue experiments in principle is
unreasonable. However, to fully meet a reasonable sceptical challenge, along the lines of their
reconstruction of Crowther et al., in practice a new generation of analogue experiments showing
Hawking radiation in diverse media is needed.
Notwithstanding these debates it is abundantly clear that whilst the issue of confirmation
in the context of analogue simulation is a live one – uncontestedly in the case of accessible
target systems, contestedly for inaccessible target systems – it is simply not relevant to the
case of analogue representations. A little consideration of the nature of inductive evidence
and the fault lines of the contemporary debate regarding scientific realism demonstrates why.
Consider the inferences that a canonical empiricist and realist seek to make based upon a valid
experiment. Both empiricist and realist would agree that valid experiments will, at least in
some cases, allow us to provide inductive evidence in favour of the empirical adequacy of a
theoretical model; that is, the truth, within a certain domain, of empirical statements which
can be derived from the model. This confirmation is built upon a correspondence between
empirical terms in the model and observations drawn from the experiment.
We can set out the structure of the confirmation inference in simple Bayesian terms as
follows. We denote by H the claim that a particular (plausible) theory is empirically adequate
in a given domain, and E that a particular empirical prediction of the theory within that domain
obtains. We thus have that H → E, which means (almost trivially) that P (H|E) > P (H),
given that both 0 < P (H) < 1 and 0 < P (E) < 1, and so we have confirmation of H by E. It
is instructive to break this very standard inference down a little. Bayes’ theorem states:
P (H|E) = P (E|H)P (H)
P (E) , (1)
where we take the marginals, P (H) and P (E), to be strictly in the interval [0, 1], but otherwise
rationally unconstrained. Given that we have assumed that H → E, it follows necessarily that
P (E|H) = 1. It then immediately follows that the confirmation measure 4 = P (H|E)−P (H)
is greater than zero, and we have Bayesian confirmation of H by E.
So far this is relatively uncontroversial. What is a subject of enduring controversy is the
further move that the realist seeks to make. That is, to argue that, in at least some cases,
we are licensed to make a further meta-inference to the truth (or approximate truth) of extra-
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empirical terms based upon (for example) inference to the best explanation or the avoidance
of ‘miracles’. The details of this controversy are not important for our purposes. Rather, what
is important is that in arguing that the extra-empirical terms can be confirmed by inductive
evidence the realist should not attempt to proceed directly via induction based on the first-
order evidence. This is for good reason: we have sufficient rationale to believe that theories with
false extra-empirical terms can be empirically adequate in a variety of domains. The connection
between the extra-empirical terms and the empirical observations is thus underdetermined to
such a degree that it would be rather foolish to try to argue directly from empirical adequacy
to truth in general terms. Moreover, we have, in fact, various general reasons, drawn from
internal inconsistency (e.g. the well known problems with infinities in general relativity and
quantum field theories), conflict between existing theories (such as quantum field theory and
general relativity), and, most infamously, the history of science (Laudan, 1981; Lyons, 2002;
Vickers, 2013), to expect that none of our current theories can be taken to be true simpliciter.
Thus, strictly speaking, if we were going to put forward a Bayesian analysis where H is now
the claim that a theory is true simpliciter, whilst we would have that H → E, and thus that
P (E|H) = 1, confirmation is blocked since we have good reason to set P (H) = 0. Furthermore,
if we weaken the realist stance such that H is the claim that a theory is approximately true,
not only is it no longer the case that H → E, but we might plausibly set P (E|H) close to zero
(Lyons, 2003). We thus see that such direct arguments for confirmation of truth are on rather
shaky ground. Realist arguments for confirmation must be founded, if they can be founded at
all, on second-order evidence such as the continued success of science in general (Dawid and
Hartmann, 2018).
The plausibility of making an argument for confirmation via analogue representation is
even more tenuous. The correspondence between the extra-empirical terms in the target model
and the empirical terms in the source model is obviously explained, without the truth of the
former, since the source system has specifically been arranged to ensure the correspondence!
Since it exists by our own arrangement, the correspondence between these terms carries no
particular inductive weight, and so provides no license for taking analogue representations to
be confirmatory. Again, a sketch of the relevant relationships in Bayesian terms will prove
worthwhile. Take H to be the claim that a particular extra-empirical term in our target model
is true (i.e. corresponds to an ‘element of reality’), and take E to be the successful analogue
representation of the empirical counterpart to that term in an experiment on a source system.
The syntactic correspondence between extra-empirical terms in MT and empirical terms in MS
is arguably independent of their respective empirical adequacy or truth. Thus, it seems difficult
to avoid the conclusion that we should set P (E|H) = P (E), and thus P (H|E) = P (H), which
implies 4 = 0, and thus that no confirmation can obtain.
This brings us to the question of what analogue representations are for, if not confirma-
tion. A tentative answer, that we will put to use below comes from the idea of how-possibly
explanation. First introduced by Dray (1957, §VI), how-possibly explanation is a rival kind
of explanation to deductive-nomological explanations.12 Persson (2012) provides a productive
12For more discussion on how-possibly explanation see (Forber, 2010; Bokulich, 2014; Cuffaro, 2015).
Hangleiter et al. (2017) argue that how-possibly understanding can be understood as a supplementary function
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way, for our current purposes, to conceive of how-possibly explanation: how-possibly explana-
tion offers a potential how-explanation that explores the space of possible explanantia for some
explanandum. As part of formulating such how-possibly explanation, we must metaphysically
and epistemically ‘bracket’, in the sense that the explanation is not about how the world actu-
ally is, nor do we know whether the explanation is true. Persson (2012, p.282) claims that the
context of this type of how-possibly explanation
is typically one of discovery, hypothesis generation, or the exploration of a range of possible
explanations in a research environment where the explanandum phenomenon is accepted as a
fact and now needs to be integrated with the system.
Reutlinger et al. (2017) rationally reconstruct the epistemic goal of toy modelling in science,
claim that how-possibly explanation is one such goal, and go on to identify at least three epis-
temic functions of how-possibly explanation that endow it with value for the scientist. The first
is a modal function: how-possibly explanation is valuable when “scientists want to understand
whether and why some phenomenon is possibly or necessarily the case” (Reutlinger et al., 2017,
p.26). The second epistemic function is a heuristic function: how-possibly explanation is valu-
able when it stimulates further investigation into a more accurate model of the target system.
The final epistemic function is a pedagogical function: how-possibly explanation is valuable
when used for illustrative purposes to “enable students and researchers to quickly grasp the
idea behind. . . the description of a phenomenon” (Reutlinger et al., 2017, p.26).
We think it is plausible to take analogue representation to be a fruitful means to provide
all three of these functions. The following section will articulate why, based upon the example
of the bouncing oil droplet and pilot wave theory.
4 What can we learn from the walker experiments?
In this section we first introduce a reason to be optimistic about the possibility of the walker
experiments being an analogue simulation of quantum phenomena (§4.1). We then provide
a more significant reason to treat them as analogue representations (§4.2). In doing so, we
argue that the walker experiments cannot provide inductive evidence for a pilot wave ontology
for quantum phenomena, whether de Broglie’s double solution theory or not. Finally, in §4.3,
we consider the prospect that the walker experiments might still be valuable in terms of the
how-possible explanation they provide.
4.1 Surrogacy aspect
An analogue simulation requires a syntactic isomorphism between two modelling frameworks
that we take to be adequate models of the potential analogues. It is clear in the current context
that one of those modelling frameworks is de Broglie’s double solution theory, as a model of
quantum phenomena. However, there does not seem to be an obvious candidate for a model
that would stand in for the fluid mechanical walker system. Against this background, Borghesi
of certain forms of analogue simulation.
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(2017) has developed a classical toy model in light of the fluid mechanical walker system and
de Broglie’s double solution theory.
Motivated by the desire to model the walker system in a relativistically covariant manner,
Borghesi’s model consists of a vibrating elastic medium carrying a transverse wave, φ,13 and a
point-like ‘concretion’ (a very concentrated heterogeneity of the medium itself). The mechanism
of the model is comprised of an equation of motion for the concretion, in which the motion of
the concretion is deflected by the gradient of φ at its location, and a wave equation that can be
interpreted as an inhomogeneous Klein-Gordon-like equation in the presence of a wave source
localised at the position of the concretion and dependent upon its vibration (Borghesi, 2017,
p.938). A curious simplification of this toy model leads to interesting consequences.
To reflect better the interrelation in the walker experiments between the walker and the
surface wave, Borghesi assumes that the concretion no longer acts as the wave source after “a
kind of self-adaptive phenomenon between the transverse wave φ and the concretion” (Borghesi,
2017, p.939). This establishes an ‘intimate harmony’ between the wave and the concretion,
which Borghesi labels ‘symbiosis’, such that there is no back-reaction of the concretion on φ (as
is the case for the de Broglie guiding equation (Holland, 2005)). The regime in which symbiosis
is possible requires that in the proper reference frame of the concretion, the concretion is located
at a local extremum of φ. In this regime, the mass continuity equation leads to a concretion
speed constant in time, and so reflects conservation of particle energy in the absence of an
external potential, and it also leads to a relation that Borghesi calls the φ-guidance formula. In
the low-velocity approximation, the φ-guidance formula reduces to be syntactically isomorphic
to de Broglie’s guiding equation.
Perhaps more remarkably, when the concretion is not the source of the wave, and assuming
“that the time period of transverse oscillations is much shorter [than] the characteristic evo-
lution time of the (perceivable) motion of the concretion”, then the motion of the concretion
(in symbiosis with the wave) is guided exclusively by the φ-guidance formula (Borghesi, 2017,
p.941). That is, averaged over one transverse oscillation, the equation of motion for the concre-
tion does not play any role in its motion. This ‘cancellation’ of the equation of motion in the
symbiotic regime, due to the φ-guidance formula, ensures that the velocity of the concretion is
directly proportional to the gradient of the wave, in contrast to an equation of motion which
relates an external potential to particle acceleration.
In the symbiotic regime, where the concretion satisfies the φ-guidance formula, the following
can also be derived from the model: a ‘wave potential’, syntactically isomorphic to the quantum
potential derived by de Broglie (1927a) and Bohm (1952); an expression for the energy of the
concretion in the low-velocity limit that contains a ‘rest mass’ term and an additional energy
term, Ec, equal to a coefficient multiplied by an additional pulsation beyond the transverse
vibrations of the wave, ω; a proportionality coefficient between wave and particle character-
istics of the model that, when represented by the term ~, renders the additional energy term
Ec = ~ω, syntactically isomorphic to the Planck-Einstein relation; and a low-velocity approxi-
mation of the Klein-Gordon-like wave equation without source that is syntactically isomorphic
to the free Schro¨dinger equation. Moreover, these expressions can be combined to produce an
13φ denotes a transverse displacement and not a phase.
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expression for the energy and momentum of the concretion that are syntactically isomorphic
to expressions that represent the energy and momentum of a quantum system. On this final
isomorphism, Borghesi (2017, p.946) points out: “This point confirms in our system what de
Broglie had suggested, here restricted to energy and momentum: the particle accounts for
quantities commonly attributed to the wave-like nature of the system in quantum mechanics”.
Based on these claims, we can see that there is a syntactic isomorphism between at least
some of the empirical terms in Borghesi’s fluid dynamical modelling framework for the walker
system and de Broglie’s truncated provisional theory – that is, pilot wave theory. Moreover,
and this is slightly more contentious, in so far as de Broglie toyed with some form of the Klein-
Gordon equation as the wave equation for his u-waves, Borghesi derives a wave equation (from
a principle of least action) that can be interpreted as an inhomogeneous Klein-Gordon-like
equation in the presence of a wave source (although Borghesi himself does not go so far as to
endorse any analogy on this point). It would be incorrect to claim that there is anything close
to a syntactic isomorphism at play between these latter two wave equations, but the two wave
equations have similar form (and, recall, de Broglie never found the precise wave equation for
his u-waves).
Establishing a syntactic isomorphism is cause to be optimistic that the walker experiments
might count as an analogue simulation of pilot wave theory. But there are good reasons to
take this surrogacy aspect as a subsidiary function of the experiments and to understand the
principal function of the experiments as representational.
4.2 Representational Aspect
Consider transcribing the relation between the walker experiments and pilot wave theory onto
Fig.1. On the ‘source’ side of the diagram the transcription is straightforward. The source
system, S, is the fluid mechanical walker system. The phenomena, PS, are the range of typically
quantum behaviours displayed by the walker system such as diffraction, interference, quantised
orbits, tunnelling, etc. The modelling framework, MS, is Borghesi’s classical toy model of the
symbiotic concretion and elastic medium. On the ‘target’ side of the diagram the transcription
is a little less clear. To begin with, in contrast to the analogue black hole case, the inaccessible
piece of the puzzle that is the focus of this analogue experiment is not the phenomena PT ;
in this case PT is simply the quantum phenomena. The modelling framework, MT , that we
are taking to be syntactically isomorphic to Borghesi’s framework is de Broglie’s truncated
provisional pilot wave theory. But what exactly is the target system, T?
In so far as PT is the quantum phenomena, one might assume that the target system is simply
any quantum system. But we do not need an analogue simulation to tell us about quantum
systems; quantum systems are perfectly accessible and we have a perfectly good modelling
framework that is highly empirically adequate: quantum mechanics. Thus it should be clear
that the walker experiments are not attempting to provide evidence in favour of quantum
mechanics simpliciter. If the walker experiments are showing us anything, they are providing
us with a macroscopic representation of wave-particle duality, as portrayed by pilot wave theory.
One might argue, then, that T must be a system of the sort described by pilot wave theory
(that is, not simply any quantum mechanical system, but a pilot wave system). As such, the
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target seems to be extra-empirical in nature; T , the claim might go, is an ontological framework
for quantum mechanics.
As we have argued above, any inference from the walker experiments to an ontological
framework for quantum mechanics is not epistemically justifiable. Rather than playing the role
of an analogue simulation, the walker experiments constitute an analogue representation. On
account of the argument in §3.3, it is simply a category error to think that the sort of empirical
support that experiments provide can be marshalled in favour of an extra-empirical claim as
part of an analogue representation such as this – experiments cannot provide inductive support
for extra-empirical statements. Quantum mechanics, as a modelling framework, notoriously
underdetermines quantum ontology, and as striking as the typically quantum behaviour of the
walker experiments is, they simply cannot provide epistemic warrant in favour of a pilot wave
ontology for quantum mechanics.
This simple point makes it difficult to suggest that the walker experiments can be providing
us with inductive evidence regarding de Broglie’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, or
quantum mechanics more generally. However, this need not render the walker experiments as
epistemically worthless – after all, the reproduction of so many typically quantum phenomena,
and the concrete representation of wave-particle duality via a pilot wave, particularly of the
sort envisaged in de Broglie’s double solution theory, is extraordinary. We contend that the
epistemic value of the walker system should be understood in terms of how-possibly explanation.
4.3 Explanatory aspect
We can proffer here a rational reconstruction of the epistemic goals of the experimental teams
undertaking the walker experiments and map it neatly over to the conception of how-possibly
explanation from §3.3. Since any particular phenomenon only makes sense as an explanans in
the context of a scientific model or theory, we take the explanans in the current case to be the
walker experiments in the context of de Broglie’s double solution theory. It then seems reason-
able to suppose that the experimental teams undertaking the walker experiments are taking the
explanandum to be the mechanism that underlies wave-particle duality in the double solution
theory: by what physical mechanism, according to the double solution pilot wave theory, could
the interrelation between particle and wave be established? The walker experiments, in combi-
nation with the double solution theory, demonstrate a possible (classical) mechanism through
which that interrelation can be established. As an explanation of this explanandum, it does not
seem that the Paris and MIT experimenters presume that the experiment is a representation of
how the world actually is, nor that they know whether this mechanism for wave-particle duality
is true of the double solution pilot wave theory. In other words, claims about the world have
been metaphysically and epistemically bracketed. Furthermore, the walker experiments surely
must be taken to be performed in the context of “discovery” and “hypothesis generation” in
the face of acceptance that quantum mechanics renders wave-particle duality as a fact that is
in need of integration, metaphysically speaking, with the rest of contemporary physics. Thus,
given Persson’s conception of how-possibly explanation, it seems a suitable characterisation of
the utility of the walker experiments. But is there value in this utility?
Recall the three epistemic functions of how-possibly explanation that endow it with value
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according to Reutlinger et al. (2017): the modal function; the heuristic function; and the
pedagogical function. All three can be seen to hold for the walker experiments: the first since
the experiments are concerned with whether it is possible to represent coherently wave-particle
duality by means of a pilot wave mechanism of the type envisaged by de Broglie’s double
solution theory; the second since the fluid mechanical model provides a concrete representation
of the ontology of de Broglie’s double solution theory, and therein a pilot wave mechanism
for wave-particle duality, and this suggests that de Broglie’s incomplete double solution theory
might be worthy of renewed exploration; and the third since the walker experiments patently
provide a clear representational tool for visualising a classical mechanism that underlies typically
quantum behaviour, as well as more specifically a tool for visualising the pilot wave ontology
of the double solution theory.14
On account of these epistemic functions of how-possibly explanation, the walker experiments
have definite epistemic value as an analogue representation. This is despite the fact that there
appears to be no epistemic justification for the walker system to play the role of an analogue
simulation, or material surrogate, of quantum mechanics, and so tell us anything at all about
quantum mechanics itself.
5 Final thoughts
There is evidently something remarkable about the fact that a series of experiments consisting
of a vibrating bath of silicone oil sustaining bouncing droplets on its surface could provide a
concrete representation of the ontology of a long forgotten pilot wave theory of quantum me-
chanics (one developed when quantum mechanics was in its infancy, to boot). As we have seen
here, however, we must not be too hasty in considering the debate around the metaphysical
consequences of quantum mechanics to be any closer to resolution as a result. The framework
of analogue simulation is capable of providing epistemic licence to raise our probability that we
will observe some phenomenon of a target system on account of observing some phenomenon in
a source system. However, the relation between the walker experiments and de Broglie’s double
solution theory does not fit naturally into the analogue simulation framework. Rather, these
experiments are better understood as an example of analogue representation. Significantly, we
should not take analogue representation to establish anything beyond mere plausibility for the
existence of elements of reality corresponding to extra-empirical terms, such as the ontology
of quantum mechanics claimed by the double solution theory. Thus the walker experiments
provide us with no justification to say anything more about quantum mechanics beyond the
plausibility of some metaphysical framework – and pilot wave theory is already considered a
plausible metaphysical framework for quantum mechanics. This notwithstanding, the walker
experiments plausibly do provide us with a how-possibly explanation for the mechanism that
underlies wave-particle duality in the double solution pilot wave theory. Not only does this
provide a clear pedagogical tool for visualising both a classical mechanism underlying typi-
cally quantum behaviour and the pilot wave ontology of the double solution theory, but it also
suggests that further investigation in quantum foundations into de Broglie’s incomplete dou-
14One only need search YouTube for an array of examples of the pedagogical value of the walker experiments.
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ble solution theory could plausibly prove fruitful. Furthermore, as already noted, by pointing
us towards the distinction between analogue simulation and analogue representation in cur-
rent scientific practice the walker experiments evidence the wider philosophical moral that the
relations of ‘material surrogacy’ and ‘material representation’ are distinct.
There are many more points of interest concerning the relation between the walker experi-
ments and quantum mechanics that have not been addressed in this paper. One such issue is
the classicality of the fluid mechanical model. Attempts in recent years to describe typically
quantum correlations in terms of classical causal modelling frameworks (Spirtes et al., 2000;
Pearl, 2009) have notoriously failed, and significant steps have been taken towards a quantum
version of causal modelling (Leifer and Spekkens, 2013; Cavalcanti and Lal, 2014; Costa and
Shrapnel, 2016; Allen et al., 2017). Accordingly, one must attach a healthy level of scepticism to
the idea that a classical fluid mechanical model could reproduce typically quantum correlations,
as any classical mechanism looks likely to be too impoverished to do so (despite the arguments
of Vervoort (2016)). And this is the rather sizeable elephant in the room in the context of
asking what bouncing oil droplets can tells us about quantum mechanics: the walker exper-
iments thus far performed evidently lack the capacity to act as either analogue simulations
or analogue representations of quantum entanglement. As Bush (2015, p.287) puts it, since
the typically quantum behaviour of the walker arises as a function of chaotic dynamics, “[t]he
question remains open as to whether some combination of intrusive measurement and chaotic
pilot wave dynamics might give rise to a hydrodynamic analog of entanglement.” Progress on
this issue could significantly change the nature of the relation between the walker experiments
and quantum mechanics as we have presented it here but, as it stands, we do not expect the
walker experiments to be an analogue representation or simulation of any entanglement-based
quantum phenomena that involve the violation of Bell-type inequalities. However, we should
certainly not dismiss the walker experiments as scientifically valueless on such a basis.15 While
one might portray quantum entanglement, or the measurement problem, as the defining feature
of quantum theory, another legitimate candidate for this mantle is wave-particle duality. In so
far as the walker experiments provide a concrete representation of wave-particle duality, and
how-possibly explanation for the mechanism that underlies wave-particle duality in the double
solution pilot wave theory, there remains in the walker experiments epistemic value for quantum
foundations research.
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